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Abstract
We examine whether male investors are biased against female entrepreneurs. To do so, we
use a proprietary dataset from AngelList covering fundraising startups. We find that female
founders are less successful with male investors compared to observably similar male founders. In
contrast, the same female founders are more successful than male founders with female investors.
The results do not appear to be driven by diﬀerences across founder gender in startup quality,
sector focus, or risk. Given that investors are predominately male, our results suggest that an
increase in female investors is likely necessary to support an increase in female entrepreneurship.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that there is a significant gender gap in entrepreneurship. Recent studies of
high-growth startup activity in the US find that only roughly 10-15% of startups are founded
by women (Tracy, 2011; Brush et al., 2014; Gompers and Wang, 2017b). Many explanations for
this phenomenon have been oﬀered, including gender diﬀerences in technical training as well as
diﬀerences in risk aversion.1 According to such explanations, women drop oﬀ from entrepreneurial
career paths long before they reach the point of seeking financing from a venture capitalist (VC)
or angel investor. On the other hand, many have speculated that much of the gender gap may
in fact be due to a lower propensity for investors to fund female entrepreneurs seeking capital.
This view largely stems from the fact that over 90% of VCs are men (Gompers et al., 2014). For
example, a recent article in the New York Times states that, “venture capitalists are, in a way, the
gatekeepers to Silicon Valley, and if they are a group of white men [...] it is no wonder that most
of the entrepreneurs fit the same mold.”2 Some male investors may be reluctant to fund female
entrepreneurs due to unconscious, implicit bias. Others may be overtly sexist or disrespectful
towards female entrepreneurs. Highlighting the second possibility, several high profile investors,
including Justin Caldbeck (Binary Capital), Chris Sacca (Lowercase Capital), and Dave McClure
(500 Startups), all recently resigned amidst allegations of sexual harassment by female entrepreneurs
with whom they had business dealings. These cases, combined with similar allegations at Uber and
other tech companies, have brought widespread attention to the treatment of women in Silicon
Valley.
Rigorously examining whether female entrepreneurs are at a disadvantage in raising capital from
male investors has been diﬃcult for several reasons. First and foremost, standard data sources only
provide information on startups that have successfully raised capital, as it is challenging to system-
atically identify startups in the pre-financing stage. From these data, it is evident that women are
1See Marianne (2011) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) for surveys of empirical and experimental evidence of
diﬀerences in risk attitudes by gender. For example, Bonin et al. (2007) find that risk preferences predict occupational
sorting.
2https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/business/dealbook/female-run-venture-funds-alter-the-status-
quo.html?_r=0
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dramatically under-represented among funded entrepreneurs. However, this under-representation
does not necessarily point toward diﬀerential treatment of women by investors. In particular, it
may be that women are just as under-represented in the pool of those seeking funding. Some have
also found that, among funded entrepreneurs, female founders are more likely to pair with female
investors (e.g., Marom, Robb, and Sade, 2016). However, this also does not necessarily indicate
that male investors are reluctant to fund women. It may be that male investors see fewer companies
with female founders due to the nature of their networks, but are no less likely to fund the female
founders that they do see. In addition, investment is a two-sided decision in that it must both be
oﬀered by an investor and accepted by an entrepreneur. It may be that female founders garner
equal interest from male and female investors, but are more likely to accept funding from female
investors.
A second challenge is that female-led companies may diﬀer from male-led companies in ways
that make them less favorable investments on average. To the extent that such investment charac-
teristics are unobservable in the data, but are observable to investors, it may appear that investors
are reluctant to invest in women when in fact they are screening on other attributes. Moreover,
even if investors cannot observe these characteristics, but know that they correlate with gender,
they may statistically discriminate against female entrepreneurs, which is distinct from taste-based
discrimination.
In order to address these challenges, we use a proprietary dataset obtained from AngelList, a
popular online platform started in 2010 that connects investors with seed stage startups. Companies
create profiles on AngelList describing their businesses and founding teams. They can then start a
fundraising campaign wherein they specify the amount of capital they are trying to raise along with
other desired deal terms. Accredited investors—both angels and VCs—can register on the platform
and subsequently connect with companies seeking funds. The site is widely used, even among high
quality startups. By 2013, over 60% of companies raising a seed round had an AngelList profile and
more than half of those firms attempted to raise capital through the site (Bernstein, Korteweg, and
Laws, 2017). Many well-known companies, such as Uber and Pinterest, have raised capital through
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AngelList.
There are several advantages of this setting for studying the impact of gender on entrepreneurial
fundraising. First, unlike much of the past work on this topic, we are not limited to studying
startups that successfully raised capital. Instead, we observe a large set of startups that are trying
to raise capital—some of which succeed and some of which fail. This allows us to characterize the
population of founders seeking financing in a way that has not previously been possible, and to more
directly examine whether gender appears to be an important determinant of fundraising success.
Second, because our data come directly from AngelList, we also observe other investor actions that
are not publicly visible. In particular, we see when an investor decides to “share” a company profile
with someone else or “request an introduction” to the founders. As noted earlier, investment is a
two-sided decision, but many of the other outcomes we are able to study are expressions of interest
that only involve an action on the part of the investor. These actions also precede any personal
interactions with founders that may diﬀer across investors and thus complicate the analysis. Third,
because of the nature of the platform, all investors have “access” to all deals in the sense that
they can see the exact same information about the same set of companies and are free to take
action on any company. Therefore, each investor’s information and opportunity set is the same, at
least with regard to the one-sided actions discussed above. Finally, we are also able to accurately
observe the gender of both the founders and the investors based on their names and profile pictures.
This feature of the data means that we can benchmark the behavior of male investors to that of
female investors for the same set of companies. For example, if female-led companies tend to have
unfavorable investment characteristics, one might expect both male and female investors to respond
similarly to these characteristics.
We consistently find that female-led companies experience more diﬃculty garnering interest and
raising capital from male investors compared to observably similar male-led companies. In particu-
lar, women are less successful with male investors, even controlling for a battery of startup/founder
characteristics that encompass much of the information that was available to investors online when
making the decisions we are studying. We view the establishment of this fact as major contribu-
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tion. Any debate about statistical versus taste-based discrimination begins from the premise that
there is diﬀerential treatment in the first place. However, up until this point, most evidence of
diﬀerential treatment in the entrepreneurship setting has been indirect at best, due to the fact that
most datasets only cover startups that successfully raise capital. Both statistical and taste-based
discrimination represent a causal eﬀect of gender. Of course, disentangling the two is notoriously
diﬃcult. Nonetheless, we attempt to do so to the extent possible by taking advantage of unique
aspects of our setting.
First we investigate the possibility that our results are driven by unobservable startup charac-
teristics correlated with founder gender. In particular, we benchmark the behavior of male investors
to that of female investors for the same set of companies. If male investors are not responding to
gender but to unfavorable startup characteristics correlated with gender—which we are unable to
control for—we should expect female investors to respond similarly to these unfavorable startup
characteristics; therefore, female investors should also show less interest in female-led startups.
However, we do not find this to be the case. Rather, we find that the same female-led startups
in our sample are actually more likely to be shared, to receive a request for an introduction, and
to ultimately get funded by female investors than observably similar male-led startups. If female
investors are unbiased, this would suggest that, if anything, these female-led startups have more
favorable unobservable investment characteristics. That could plausibly be the case if, for example,
only the best women enter entrepreneurship due perceived diﬃculties for them in that field, whereas
there is less positive self-selection intro entrepreneurship for men.
Still, several alternative interpretations remain possible. First, it could be that investors have
a screening and/or monitoring advantage with companies led by founders of the same gender as
themselves. For example, female-led companies may tend to operate in sectors that are geared
toward female customers, and male investors may have less expertise in these sectors than female
investors. To explore this possibility, we repeat our analysis on various sub-samples of “gender-
neutral” startups—for example, startups that three independent evaluators categorized as equally
likely to have been founded by a man or a woman based on the non-founder sections of their
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profiles. The results are similar in these subsamples, suggesting that female entrepreneurs are at a
disadvantage with male investors, even when there is nothing obviously female about their startup’s
business description.
Alternatively, female-led startups may have diﬀerent payoﬀ distributions than male-led startups.
For example, female-led startups may oﬀer relatively low expected payoﬀs but with relatively low
variance as compared to male-led startups. In that case, if male investors are more risk-tolerant
than female investors, they may prefer to invest in male-led startups while female investors prefer
to invest in female-led startups. In order to investigate this, we examine the correlation between
male and female investor interest, holding founder gender fixed. Within both the male-led-only
and female-led-only startup samples, we find a strong positive correlation between female investor
interest and male investor interest. This suggests that the two groups of investors evaluate companies
similarly. If they targeted diﬀerent payoﬀ distributions we should instead find that, among startups
with founders of a given gender, the ones female investors are interested in tend to be ones that
male investors are not and vice versa.
Finally, it is also possible that female investors are motivated in part by non-financial consider-
ations, such as a desire to help other women, while male investors are only financially motivated. In
that case, male investors could be reluctant to fund female-led companies because they are worse in-
vestments, while female investors simultaneously prefer to invest in the same female-led companies.
To investigate this potential explanation, we examine startup outcomes. If female investors prefer
to invest in female founders due to non-financial motives, we should expect to see female-female
investor-founder pairs underperform female-male pairs ex-post. Similarly, if male investors prefer to
invest in male founders due to financial motives, we should expect to see male-male investor-founder
pairs outperform male-female pairs ex-post. These tests are analogous to Fisman, Paravisini, and
Vig (2017). Instead, we find that, for a given female investor, the female-led startups that she pairs
with are statistically indistinguishable from the male-led startups she pairs with in terms of their
probability of failure or probability of success (i.e., exit via IPO/acquisition). For a given male
investor, the male-led startups that he pairs with, underperform the female-led startups he pairs
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with on both measures. These results suggest that, if anything, it is male investors who appear to
have non-financial motivations for investing within-gender.
Overall, our results are most consistent with either (1) taste-based discrimination by male in-
vestors and no gender discrimination by female-investors or (2) taste-based discrimination by both
male and female investors in favor of their own gender, i.e., “homophilistic preferences.” Note that
even if male and female investors have symmetric taste-based motivations for preferring to invest
within-gender, such taste-based motivations are of greater concern for female founders, as the bulk
of early stage investors are male. Thus, in either case, an important implication of our results
would be that more female investors are likely to be necessary to support the entry of more female
entrepreneurs.
It is worth pointing out that this implication would also follow, even if our baseline results were
actually driven by within-gender screening/monitoring advantages that we are unable to account
for empirically. That is, if female entrepreneurs tend to start businesses that are hard from male
investors to understand, more female investors would be necessary to support the entry of female
entrepreneurs. In that sense, even if the mechanism underlying our baseline results cannot be pinned
down definitively, the results are meaningful nevertheless.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on gender and entrepreneurship. Many stud-
ies have shown that women are extremely under-represented among venture-backed entrepreneurs.
Gompers and Wang (2017b) find that just 10.7% of venture-backed founders were women from
2010–2015. Brush et al. (2014) estimate the number to be 15% using data from 2011-2013. Defin-
ing entrepreneurship more broadly, Tracy (2011) finds that 12.4% of “high-impact” firms with less
than 20 employees in 2004–2008 were owned by women. In contrast to these papers, we are able
to estimate the female share both among those who successfully raise capital but also among those
seeking capital who do not succeed in raising it. In contemporaneous work, Raina (2017) asks
whether venture capitalists play a role in the lower female participation in entrepreneurship. Our
focus on both funded and non-funded startups allows us to separate out a larger set of alternative
explanations while also isolating the role of investor gender.
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Other studies have shown that women are also underrepresented on the investor side. For exam-
ple, Gompers et al. (2014) find that just 6.1% of VCs are women. This naturally begs the question
of whether finance plays a role in the under-representation of women among venture-backed en-
trepreneurs. Coleman and Robb (2009, 2016) find that women who do become entrepreneurs use
less external equity financing and, possibly as a result, hire fewer employees and have slower busi-
nesses grow. Brooks et al. (2014) conduct a lab experiment in which the same entrepreneurial pitch
is delivered by a man and a woman and then evaluated by non-investor experiment participants.
They find that participants are significantly more likely to make mock investments in male en-
trepreneurs than female entrepreneurs delivering the same pitch. Our paper diﬀers in that we study
real investors making equity investments in real companies. In addition, we investigate whether
the gender of the investor plays a role in how the gender of the participant is evaluated. Marom,
Robb, and Sade (2016) study fundraising campaigns on the crowdfunding site Kickstarter. They
find evidence that men are significantly less likely than women to back women-led projects.3 Our
analysis diﬀers in that we study equity financing by angel and VC investors rather than rewards-
based crowdfunding. Thus, we seek to understand the extent to which diﬀerential treatment of
women by traditional investors plays a role in explaining the previously documented entrepreneur-
ship gender gap. In contrast, Marom, Robb, and Sade (2016) seek to understand the extent to which
the advent of crowdfunding may help to democratize access to capital by dramatically changing the
composition and incentives of capital providers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background about AngelList.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The AngelList Platform
Traditionally, seed-stage startup financing has largely been done through personal networks. Founders
often seek capital from potential investors who they either know directly or indirectly through a
3Greenberg and Mollick (2017) provide an explanation using both lab and observational data for why women
might perform better on these platforms.
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mutual acquaintance. AngelList was founded in 2010 with the goal of making it easier for founders
and investors to connect. Since launching, the platform has attracted much attention and grown
rapidly in popularity, becoming an important part of the startup ecosystem. By 2013, over 60%
of companies raising a seed round had an AngelList profile and more than half of these firms at-
tempted to raise capital through the site (Bernstein, Korteweg, and Laws, 2017). Many well-known
companies, such as Uber and Pinterest, have raised capital through AngelList.
The website allows founders to create startup profiles describing their idea, progress thus far,
and personal/professional background. They can then start a fundraising campaign wherein they
specify the amount of capital they are trying to raise along with other desired deal terms. Accred-
ited investors—both angels and VCs—can register on the platform and subsequently connect with
companies seeking funds. There are a variety of ways that an investor can interact with a startup.
First, an investor can "share" a startup profile with someone else—either another AngelList user
(through a private message) or someone oﬀ the platform (through an email with an embedded
link). Investors often share deals with others that they know may be interested. Since multiple
investors are frequently involved in a round of financing, sharing a deal also does not necessarily
preclude the sharer from investing as well. Second, an investor can request an “introduction” to a
startup. If the request is accepted, the investor can communicate directly with the founders and
view confidential documents such as pitch decks, financials, or in depth business plans. Absent
an introduction, communication is not possible, nor is full data access. Importantly, introduction
requests can only be made to startups with an active fundraising campaign. Thus, a request for
an introduction can be viewed as a direct precursor to investment. Indeed, startups in our sample
that receive an introduction request are five times as likely to raise capital as those that do not.
Finally, an investor can “fund” a startup. This last step happens oﬄine, although founders can and
do self-report consummated financing rounds in the funding section of their startup profile. Aside
from the cost of making an investment, investor actions on AngelList are costless and private. For
example, there is no limit on the number of introduction requests an investor can make, and no one
on the platform other than the recipient can observe the request. In addition, all investors have
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“access” to all deals in the sense that they can see the exact same information about the same set
of companies and are free to take action on any company.
In recent years, AngelList has also begun facilitating financings directly through the platform
with equity crowdfunding syndicates. As of the time we obtained our data from AngelList, syndi-
cates were still a fairly nascent addition to the site. Thus, we focus exclusively on the original “social
network for startups” part of the platform as described above. The only other paper we are aware
of that uses AngelList’s proprietary data is Bernstein, Korteweg, and Laws (2017).4 They examine
how the likelihood of an investor visiting a startup’s profile is aﬀected by the inclusion or omission
of certain categories of information from an email sent to investors highlighting the startup. The
three categories of information they consider are the startup’s founding team, its traction (i.e., per-
formance metrics), and its existing investors. They find that that omitting information about the
founding team has the biggest negative impact on investor click-through rates from emails. Given
that investors on AngelList find it important to see information about the founding team, it is plau-
sible that characteristics like founder gender may play an important role in their decision-making.
In contrast to Bernstein, Korteweg, and Laws (2017), we use the full AngelList dataset rather than
focusing on the small set of companies featured in emails. We also study a broader set of investor
actions that are more closely tied to investment rather than email clicks.
3 Data
In this section we describe our key variables, data sources, and sample restrictions.
3.1 Investor-startup interactions
As described in Section 2, investors on AngelList can interact with startups in several ways that
signal interest. We focus on investor sharing, requests for introductions, and investment. Data
on sharing and introduction requests come directly from AngelList. However, as described above,
4Other papers have used data on AngelList, however, they are usually scraped from the website. Such data is
thus lacking failed fundraising and removed profiles, which are included in our sample. More importantly, scraping
the site does not reveal the signals of interest—sharing and introductions—that we use.
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actual investments occur oﬄine. Therefore, AngelList’s data on investment is user-entered and
somewhat incomplete.
We thus supplement AngelList’s investment data with three additional sources. First, we match
our sample with startups in Dow Jones’ VentureSource database. This allows us to identify compa-
nies in our sample that eventually raised money from VCs. Second, we match our sample to startups
that report raising capital on Crunchbase. Crunchbase’s coverage is likely to be better than Ven-
tureSource for seed rounds with no institutional investor. Finally, to further ensure that we capture
seed rounds as well as possible, we also match our sample with fundraising data gathered directly
from SEC Form D filings. In principle, these filings are required for all private equity financings.5
Throughout the paper, our analysis of fundraising outcomes uses all of these data sources. However,
our results remain similar when only using investment data from AngelList as well (see Appendix
Table A2).
Using all data sources, we find that 13.3% of startups with an AngelList fundraising campaign
subsequently obtain funding. This compares to a fundraising rate of 8.4% using only AngelList
investment data. Because we are interested in separately analyzing the behavior of male and female
investors, we focus primarily on funding events for which we can identify the gender of the investor.
Unfortunately, our data sources often fail to identify the individual investors involved in a round.
This either happens because no investors are identified (only the fact that a financing round occurred
is recorded by the data source), or because the investors identified are institutions rather than
individuals.6 Overall, we are only able to identify investor gender for 27% of successful financing
rounds.
5Matching with VentureSource and Crunchbase is based on a cleaned version of a startup’s web domain. Matching
with Form D filings is based on location, founding date, and company name.
6For institutional financing rounds from VentureSource, we are able determine the gender of the individual investor
who sourced the deal using board membership. That is, we assume the individuals who took board seats in the first
financing round were the ones who sourced the deal.
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3.2 Startup outcomes
We focus on two measures of startup outcomes following a fundraising campaign. The first is an
indicator equal to one if a startup has failed, based on whether its website is no longer active as of
November 2016. We deem a website as inactive if it fails to load and/or if its domain is available for
purchase. The second measure of startup outcomes is an indicator equal to one if a startup has had
a successful exit via IPO or acquisition according to VentureSource or Crunchbase. Successful exits
are quite rare in our sample. Some 4.6% of firms that raised capital in our sample had a successful
exit by November 2016. This is likely due to the fact that AngelList is relatively new, so even the
high performing companies that originally raised capital through the site have not had enough time
to have an IPO or acquisition.
3.3 Identifying gender
We identify the gender of founders and investors in our sample based on their name and profile pic-
ture. In particular, we run all first names through the genderize.io API, which gives the probability
a first name corresponds to a woman based on a large sample.7 For individuals with names that are
at all ambiguous (0 < Prob(Female) < 1) , we determine gender based on the user’s profile picture.
To do this, we use Crowdflower, which is a service like Amazon Mechanical Turk with additional
quality controls. In particular, “test pictures” for which the correct answer has already been de-
termined by us are randomly mixed in with pictures that have not been categorized. Crowdflower
contributors who fail too many test questions are excluded, and the work of less trusted contributors
is double-checked by more trusted contributors.
While we observe gender at the founder level, the outcomes we examine are at the startup level.
Therefore it is necessary to assign a gender to a startup. Many of the startups in our sample have a
single founder, in which case it is straightforward to categorize a startup as “female-led” or “male-led”
based on the gender of that founder. Some of the startups in our sample have multiple founders.
In these cases we categorize startups based on the gender of the founder who is also listed as the
7http://genderize.io
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CEO. As we will show, we find similar results whether or not we restrict attention to single-founder
companies.
3.4 Non-gender founder characteristics
A founder’s AngelList profile can include a short bio with information on their education and past
work experience. Founders often provide only sparse information about themselves on AngelList
and instead use the option to link their AngelList profile to their LinkedIn profile. In addition, for
some of the founders who do not link the two profiles, we are still able to find their LinkedIn profile
manually by searching LinkedIn for their name along with the name of their AngelList startup.
Overall, we are able to find a LinkedIn profile for 62% of our sample, although these profiles vary
in terms of which categories of information are included.8
When educational information is included, we can observe the schools a founder attended, de-
grees obtained, and years of graduation. When we observe the year of college graduation, this
provides a fairly accurate proxy for age (assuming individuals are 22 at graduation). We crudely
categorize founders as having attended an “elite” school if they hold a degree from a top-10 univer-
sity according to the 2017 U.S. News & World Report rankings. In terms of work experience, we
can observe the number of jobs held, past job titles, and number of years in the work force. We
categorize individuals as previous founders if they held the title of founder at a diﬀerent company
prior to their AngelList fundraising campaign. Appendix Table A1 provides a full listing of these
background variables.
3.5 Sector and location classification
Startups on AngelList describe themselves in part through various categories of keyword “tags.”
There are 1,805 distinct sector tags and companies can use multiple tags in combination to describe
themselves. We map these tag combinations into VentureSource sector categorizations using the
subsample of AngelList startups that also appear in VentureSource. For startups in the overlapping
8Public profiles were searched and evaluated manually by an RA.
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sample we already have both AngelList tags and VentureSource industries. For startups that are
not in the overlapping sample (i.e., only in AngelList) we identify the nearest neighbors in the
overlapping sample.9 Based on these nearest neighbors we compute a probability distribution for
each company over the seven major VentureSource industries. We then categorize a company
according to its most probable VentureSource sector.10 We also do the same using VentureSource
18-sector and 43-sector categorization schemes.
Startups use 5,841 distinct location tags. We geocode these using the google maps API and then
categorize them according to the 19-region scheme used by the National Venture Capital Association
(NVCA). The NVCA regions are coarse where there are few startups and more granular where there
are many. For example, there is one region in the Southwest, but four regions in California.
3.6 Final sample
The final sample of founders and startups satisfies several conditions that help to minimize mea-
surement error and captures a representative set of startups seeking capital in our sample period.
The sample begins with all first-time fundraising events for US startups founded between 2010 and
November 2015. Next, we require that AngelList have a founding team where we could confidently
identify the gender of each founder. Any startup that raised venture capital before our sample
period is excluded to ensure we study first-time financings. The startup’s fundraising campaign
must also have a non-missing capital sought and a non-missing business description in their profile.
Finally, we require that the startup maps to a VentureSource sector and NVCA region based on its
tags. In the end we have 17,780 startups in the sample.
9Nearest neighbors are startups with the highest number of common AngelList tags.
10Our results are similar whether we control directly for the sector probabilities, or assign according to the most
probable.
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4 Results
4.1 Summary statistics
We begin in Table 1 by examining the gender composition of entrepreneurs and investors. As
mentioned earlier, standard datasets do not cover those who have yet to successfully raise capital.
This restriction makes it impossible to assess the extent to which the gender gap that has been
documented previously among funded entrepreneurs is also present among the pool of those seeking
funding. In our data we can observe a large sample of entrepreneurs seeking funding. This allows us
to get a sense of the point in the entrepreneurial pipeline where women appear to (diﬀerentially) drop
out. We view these simple summary statistics as an important contribution in and of themselves.
Overall, we find that only 15.8% of founder CEOs who try to raise capital on AngelList are women
(21% of all founders, including non-CEOs). This suggests that, in fact, much of the gender gap
is already present before investors get directly involved. It should also be noted that the barriers
to fundraising on AngelList are arguably lower than the barriers to any other type of fundraising.
Therefore, this number likely represents an upper bound. That is, women are likely even more
under-represented among those approaching investors in the traditional manner. This large pre-
funding gender gap suggests that non-finance factors may account for a large portion of the overall
entrepreneurship gender gap (e.g., Gompers and Wang, 2017b). These factors may include innate
diﬀerences between women and men or diﬀerences that arise due to diﬀerential treatment of women
earlier in the entrepreneurial pipeline. However, it is also quite possible that many women would
be interested in raising capital for an entrepreneurial venture but are discouraged by the diﬃcult
fundraising environment they face, and so do not even try.
Table 1 also shows the gender composition of entrepreneurs in datasets that mainly cover funded
startups: Crunchbase and VentureSource. Both have a lower fraction of female founders in terms
of both founder CEOs or founding team than AngelList. It is also interesting to examine the
gender composition of investors across the three datasets. We find that some 8% of investors
with some sharing, introduction or funding activity on the AngelList platform are women. This
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number is lower than the female founder share, however, it exceeds that in the alternative datasets.
This diﬀerence with Crunchbase and particularly VentureSource provides some evidence that the
AngelList platform may have lowered barriers to entry for female investors.
Table 2 presents summary statistics separately for the male- and female-led startups in our sam-
ple. Panel A shows startup characteristics, Panel B shows startup outcomes, and Panel C shows
founder characteristics. The two groups are fairly similar on many dimensions. The main diﬀerence
in startup characteristics that we find is that male-led startups generally set higher fundraising
targets ($690,000 vs $530,000). In terms of outcomes, most startups that post a fundraising cam-
paign appear to generate relatively low levels of interest from investors. Nonetheless, men are more
successful than women in terms of generating interest. In particular male-led companies are more
likely to be shared by a male investor (14% vs 4%), to receive an introduction request from a male
investor (18% vs 14%), or get funded by a male investor (3.6% vs 1.6%).11 Male-led companies are
slightly more likely to have had an IPO or Acquisition (.8% vs .6%) and are slightly less likely to
have already failed (46% vs 48%). The average male founder in our sample is similar to the average
female founder in terms of age (35.26 vs 33.69), years of work experience (13.5 vs 12.86), number
of previous jobs held (4.61 vs 4.63), and number of co-founders (0.32 vs 0.23).
The two groups also have similar levels of educational attainment and previous founder experi-
ence. In particular male and female founders are similarly likely to hold a bachelor’s degree (48% vs
49%), MBA degree (8% vs 8%), or other advanced degree (4% vs 3%). Likewise, they have similar
previous founding experience (18% vs 13%). The education and founder experience variables are
based on the information founders post on AngelList as well as LinkedIn. It is possible that actual
educational attainment or founder experience in our sample is higher than reported if some founders
choose to omit this information from the two online profiles. Nonetheless, we interpret these vari-
ables as reflecting the information that was available to investors at the time of the fundraising
campaign. This is likely the information upon which investors decided to share or request an intro-
11As noted in Section 3.1, many rounds in the data have unknown investors. Therefore these fundraising success
rates are understated. When including unknown investors, the fundraising success rates are 13.7% and 11.4% for
male and female founders, respectively.
15
duction to a company and thus is the appropriate information to control for in regressions where
those are the outcome variables. In the process of actually funding a company, investors likely learn
additional information from conversations with the founders. Thus, when fundraising success is our
outcome variable, our ability to control for the information available to investors is more limited.
Table 3 compares the characteristics of male and female investors on AngelList. As with founders,
we find that male and female investors are similar in terms of age, experience, and education. For
the purpose of these summary statistics we limit the sample to investors who made at least one
introduction request and who linked their LinkedIn profile with their AngelList profile. However,
the subsequent analysis will include investors for whom we lack LinkedIn data.
4.2 Interactions between founders and male investors
We now explore in a regression framework whether the interest a startup receives from investors
correlates with the gender of its founder. Specifically, we estimate equations of the form:
yi = ↵+  Femalei +  
0
Xi + ✏i, (1)
Where i indexes startups, y represents various startup-level outcomes, Female is an indicator
variable equal to one if the startup has a female founder-CEO, and X represents a vector of startup-
and founder-level controls.12 We focus first on outcomes involving interest from male investors only.
We do this because male investors are more likely than female investors to exhibit bias against
female founders. Such bias would also be particularly consequential given that the bulk of investors
are male.
We begin in Table 4 by using investor sharing of a startup profile as a proxy for interest. Because
our sample consists only of startups that are raising capital, the sharing events we observe likely
represent communications among investors regarding the opportunity to invest. Despite the low
12Observations in Equation 1 are at the startup-level. We could have alternatively estimated equations at the
startup-investor pair level. However, this would require that each startup observation be repeated for each investor
on AngelList. Given the large number of investors on AngelList, doing pairwise analysis becomes computation-
ally diﬃcult. Moreover, the pairwise analysis oﬀers little advantage over the startup-level analysis, as the two are
mechanically linked.
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cost of sharing on the platform, only about 12.3% of startups in our sample were shared by an
investor. This investor selectivity with sharing suggests that sharing may indeed be a good measure
of interest. We then regress a “shared by male investor” indicator on a “female founder” indicator.
As mentioned earlier, for companies with multiple founders, we consider the CEO to be focal. That
is, the female founder indicator and all other founder-level controls correspond to the CEO.
In column (1) we include only minimal controls. Specifically, we include fixed eﬀects for the year
the startup joined AngelList and the year it posted its first fundraising campaign. These fixed eﬀects
account for the fact that older companies have had more time to generate interest among investors.
We find that, on average, female-led companies are less likely to be shared by male investors, with
diﬀerences significant at the 1% level. In terms of economic magnitudes, the coeﬃcient suggest that
female led companies are approximately 8% less likely to be shared, which is quite large relative to
a base sharing rate of 12.3%. In column (2), we control for the amount of capital sought as well
as team size, sector, and location fixed eﬀects. With the inclusion of these controls, the estimated
coeﬃcient on the female founder indicator changes little. The coeﬃcient also remains similar as we
add additional controls for education and experience in column (3). Note that the education and
experience coeﬃcient estimates have the expected sign. Startups founded by college graduates are
more likely to be shared, as are startups founded by individuals who hold a degree from an “elite”
university, and startups founded by repeat founders. For robustness, we also check in column (4)
whether our results hold when the sample is restricted to only include startups with a solo founder,
where the focal founder is unambiguous. We again estimate a similar coeﬃcient on the female
founder indicator in this restricted sample.
Finally, another form of diﬀerential treatment across genders would be a diﬀerential response
by investors to the same credentials for men and women. For example, one could imagine that
women benefit less than men from having attended an elite university in terms of generating in-
vestor interest. Such diﬀerential treatment would be along the lines of Bertrand and Mullainathan’s
(2004) finding that employers are less responsive to resume quality for job applicants with African-
American sounding names. To investigate whether a similar pattern holds in our setting, we allow
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the education and experience variables to interact with the female indicator in column (5). Overall,
we find only weak evidence of credential discounting. While most of the coeﬃcients on the esti-
mated interaction terms are negative, they are not statistically significant. The only exception is
the interaction with the previous founder indicator, which is negative and statistically significant,
suggesting that women benefit less than men from having founded a startup previously. However,
the economic magnitude of the coeﬃcient is small.
While the sharing behavior of investors is interesting to examine, the way in which sharing
relates to investment is unclear. It may be the case that observably similar female-led startups
are less likely to be shared, but when it comes to actually raising capital, female-led companies do
the same or better. To move one step closer to actual investment, Table 5 examines requests for
introductions by male investors. Such requests are a direct precursor to funding, as investors need to
request an introduction in order to communicate with a startup’s founder(s). We find qualitatively
similar results to those in Table 4. Across all specifications, female-led companies are approximately
1.5–3.5% less likely to receive a request for an introduction, as compared to a baseline introduction
rate of 17.6%. Again, companies led by repeat founders, founders with a college degree, and founders
who attended an elite university are more likely to receive requests for introductions. There is also
again little evidence that such credentials are discounted for women.
Finally, it remains possible that although male founders appear to do better than female founders
in getting early indications of interest from male investors, they do no better when it comes to
actually getting funded. While investment is perhaps more important than investor sharing or
introduction requests as an outcome, it is also more complex. Investment involves communication
that is unobservable to us, making it diﬃcult to control for an investor’s information set. Investment
is also a two-sided decision where an investor must make an oﬀer and a founder must accept it.
This means that investment could partially reflect the preferences of founders rather than investors.
Finally, we observe investment with more measurement error than sharing and introduction requests,
because much of the data are self-reported. With these caveats, in Table 6 we examine actual
fundraising outcomes.
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Again, the results that are qualitatively similar to before. After controlling for observable firm,
founder and financing characteristics, female-led startups are significantly less likely than male-led
startups to raise a round from a male investor. Thus, the previous results do not appear to have
been driven by the preliminary or lower stakes nature of investor sharing and introduction requests
relative to actual investment. In terms of magnitudes, the estimated coeﬃcients suggest a 0.6–1.7%
decline in fundraising success on a base fundraising success rate (from an investor with a known
gender) of 3.3%. Thus, the diﬀerence in outcomes for female founders is economically quite large.
Overall, we consistently find that female-led companies have significantly more diﬃculty gar-
nering interest and raising capital from male investors compared to observably similar male-led
companies. We view the establishment of this fact as an important contribution. Any debate about
statistical versus taste-based discrimination begins from the premise that there is diﬀerential treat-
ment in the first place. However, up until this point, most evidence of diﬀerential treatment in the
entrepreneurship setting has been indirect at best, due to the fact that most datasets only cover
startups that successfully raise capital.
4.3 Potential explanations
There are, of course, many potential explanations for the baseline results presented in the previous
section. We now explore these potential explanations. In particular, we consider the most likely
explanations that involve male investors having purely financial motives.
4.3.1 Diﬀerences in startup quality
First, it is possible that female-led startups tend to have undesirable investment characteristics,
which male investors respond to, and which we have not controlled for. Investors may either
screen directly on these characteristics if they can observe them, or they may screen indirectly on
these characteristics if they cannot observe them—by statistically discriminating against female
founders. In the former case, our baseline results would represent a spurious correlation driven
by omitted variable bias. In the latter case, our results would represent a causal eﬀect, but not a
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taste-driven one.13 We note again that, in our setting, prior to the acceptance of an introduction
request, we observe the exact same information as investors, which helps to reduce concerns about
direct screening on characteristics that investors observe but we do not. In Appendix Table A3,
we show that our results remain similar when we include an even more exhaustive set of controls,
including the number of characters in the product description and additional information gleaned
from LinkedIn.14 Nonetheless, it is possible that investors screen on characteristics that we do
observe in the data but are unable to fully codify and control for.
To further investigate such explanations, we benchmark the behavior of male investors to that of
female investors for the same set of companies. That is, the outcomes we now examine are whether
a startup was shared by a female investor, received an introduction request from a female investor,
or was funded by a female investor. This analysis is similar in spirit to the inclusion of startup fixed
eﬀects to control for unobservable startup characteristics. We are using the exact same sample and
regression specifications as before and are thus comparing the relative investor interest drawn by the
same female- and male-led startups. We are only changing the gender of the investors evaluating the
companies. If male investors are not responding to gender but to unfavorable startup characteristics
correlated with gender—which they may or may not observe—we should expect female investors to
respond similarly to these unfavorable startup characteristics.
However, as shown in Table 7, we do not find this to be the case. Rather, across the same
regression specifications as before, we find that the female-led startups in our sample are actually
more likely to be shared, to receive an introduction request, and to get funded by female investors
than their observably similar male-led counterparts. If female investors are unbiased, these results
would suggest that, if anything, the female-led startups in our sample have more favorable unob-
servable investment characteristics. For example, there may be more positive self-selection into
13In the case of omitted variable bias, the negative coeﬃcient we estimate on the female indicator would go to zero
using data generated by an experiment that randomized the gender of the founder displayed to investors, holding all
other aspects of a startup profile constant. In the case of statistical discrimination, such experimentally generated
data would lead to similar estimates.
14We exclude some of the LinkedIn controls from the baseline regressions because they are often missing. In
Appendix Table A3, when the LinkedIn variables are missing, we dummy them out rather than dropping observations,
so as to maximize statistical power. That is, we replace the missing values with their own fixed eﬀects. See Bailey
et al. (2017) for an example of this type of analysis.
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entrepreneurship among women than men. In particular, it may be that only the most talented
women enter entrepreneurship due the perceived diﬃculties they face in pursuing that career path.
Overall, both of the potential explanations for our baseline results discussed above—omitted
variables and statistical discrimination—are encompassed by the joint hypothesis that (1) investors
have purely financial motives and (2) they are reluctant to fund female-led startups because they
are worse investments. The results in Table 7 are inconsistent with this joint hypothesis.
4.3.2 Diﬀerences in sector focus
In light of the diﬀerential behavior of male and female investors documented above, another potential
explanation consistent with our findings thus far would be encompassed by the joint hypothesis that
(1) investors have purely financial motives and (2) male investors are reluctant to fund female-led
startups because these companies do not align with their expertise. That is, female-led startups
may not be worse investments per se, but they may still diﬀer in ways that are unappealing to male
investors (and appealing to female investors).
For example, female-led startups may tend to operate in industries that are geared predominantly
toward female customers, and male investors may have less expertise in these industries than female
investors. In that case, male investors would potentially be at a disadvantage in terms of screening
and/or monitoring companies led by female founders. We perform a variety of tests to try to explore
this possibility.
Recall that companies on AngelList describe themselves with a combination of multiple keyword
tags. The tags are very granular as evidenced by the fact that there are over 1,800 of them. In
Panel A of Table 8, we remove startups from the sample that use any tag that is predominantly
associated with one gender. We define a tag to be predominantly female if more than 32% of
startups using that tag are female-led. Similarly, we define a tag to be predominantly male if less
than 8% of startups using that tag are female-led.15 The two cutoﬀs represent double and half
the percentage of founders on AngelList that are female, respectively, as we are trying to identify
15Examples of predominantly female tags include “bridal community,” “mothers,” “child care,” and “lingerie.”
Examples of of predominantly male tags include “cars,” “console gaming,” and “proximity services.”
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tags where women are either over- or under-represented. The idea behind this test is that, while
male investors may have less insight into a female-led cosmetics company, or more insight into a
male-led facial hair grooming company, they should have no diﬀerential insight into a male- or
female-led biotech company, and thus the gender of the founder should not matter in that case.
However, even in this restricted subsample of “gender-neutral” startups, we continue to find that
male investors show less interest in female-led companies. At the same time, we also continue to
find that female investors show more interest in female-led startups, suggesting that the behavior of
male investors in this subsample is not due to poor investment characteristics for women working
outside of predominantly female industries. Appendix Table A4 shows a second test along the same
lines. In this case, we exclude all startups whose keyword tags map to consumer-related industries,
as categorized by VentureSource. We map AngelList tags to VentureSource sector categorizations
as described in Section 3.5. The idea behind this test is to try to remove startups from the sample
that even have a potential gender component, regardless of whether they actually do. We again
find very similar results in this restricted subsample.
In Panel B of Table 8, rather than trying to limit the sample to gender-neutral startups, we
instead control directly for the way a company describes itself on AngelList by including a full set
of tag combination fixed eﬀects. This means that we identify only oﬀ of variation in founder gender
among companies that describe themselves in the same way. We again find similar results with
these granular controls. That is, even among companies that describe themselves in the same way
on AngelList, male investors show less interest in female-led companies.
The above tag-based tests are still imperfect, as tags only represent part of the information
available to investors. To address this concern we manually categorize startups based on the entire
contents of their AngelList profile, excluding the founder section. Specifically, we used CrowdFlower
to obtain three “trusted judgements” from US-based human contributors with the highest quality
track record on similar “human intelligence tasks” (based on past experience and accuracy).16 After
16Contributor quality is determined on a scale of 1 to 3 by CrowdFlower based on experience and accuracy. We
only allowed the highest quality contributors to participate. To further ensure contributors were actually trying
to answer the questions correctly, 20% of the questions any given respondent answered were test questions where
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showing contributors all non-founder portions of a startup’s AngelList profile, we ask them the
following question:
Based on the description of the company, would you guess that the founder of this
company is: (1) Highly likely to be female (2) Fairly likely to be female (3) Equally
likely to be male or female (4) Fairly likely to be male (5) Highly likely to be male
We find that the trusted judgements of the human contributors were predictive of the true gender
of the founder. When we regress the true gender of a startup’s founder on indicator variables
corresponding to the first four responses to the question above, we find that the probability that
the founder is female increases monotonically with the evaluators’ subjective assessment. At the
extremes, startups labelled as highly likely to be female are five times more likely to actually have a
female founder than startups that were labelled as highly likely to have a male founder. Probability
diﬀerences from the omitted category (“Highly likely male”) are statistically significant at the 1%
level in all cases.
We use these data as conservatively as possible by limiting the sample to startups that all three
contributors unanimously categorized as “equally likely to be male or female.” Only 24% of our
original sample remains after this restriction. Nonetheless, as shown in Panel C of Table 8, we
continue to find similar results in this subsample. Appendix Table A5 shows that we also find
similar results when, rather than requiring unanimity, we instead limit the sample to startups with
a neutral mean response (i.e. a mean response strictly greater than 2 and strictly less than 4).
Together, the above evidence suggests that our baseline results are not driven by diﬀerences in
sector focus that are not captured by the controls used in our main specifications.
the founder’s gender was obvious (e.g., because it was explicitly identified in one of the non-founder portions of
the startup’s AngelList profile). The judgements of those who failed more than 10% of these test questions were
categorized as “untrusted judgements,” as were judgements that were reached too quickly (<60 seconds). These
untrusted judgements were excluded from the analysis.
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4.3.3 Diﬀerences in payoﬀ distribution
The evidence thus far suggests that male investors show less interest in female-led companies re-
gardless of sector. Another, more subtle, possibility is that female-led startups may have a diﬀerent
payoﬀ distribution than male-led startups. For example, female-led startups may oﬀer relatively
low expected payoﬀs but with relatively low variance as compared to male-led startups. In that
case, if male investors are more risk-tolerant than female investors, they may prefer to invest in
male-led startups while female investors prefer to invest in female-led startups. This explanation is
summarized by the joint hypothesis that (1) investors have purely financial motives and (2) male
investors are reluctant to fund female-led startups because these companies do not align with their
risk-preferences.17 Of course, it should be noted that, since all of the companies in our sample
are early stage, they are all quite risky in the sense that they are highly likely to fail without any
capital recouped by investors. Moreover, the investors in our sample are all self-selected to be fairly
wealthy and risk-tolerant.
Nonetheless, in order to investigate whether gender diﬀerences in startup payoﬀ distributions
and investor risk preferences drive our results, we examine the correlation between male and female
investor interest, holding founder gender fixed. First, we limit the sample to include only male-led
startups. Within this all male-led sample we re-run our baseline regressions, replacing the female
founder indicator with a female investor interest indicator corresponding to the outcome under study
(i.e. an indicator equal to one if the male-led startup was shared by a female investor, received an
introduction request from a female investor, or was funded by a female investor, respectively). If in
fact male and female investors target startups with diﬀerent risk-reward profiles, we should estimate
a negative coeﬃcient on the female investor interest indicator; among male-led startups, those that
female investors are interested in should tend to be ones that male investors are not and vice versa.
However, as shown in Panel A of Table 9, we instead find a strong positive coeﬃcient on the female
investor interest indicator, significant at the 1% level. This suggests that, holding founder gender
17Under this joint hypothesis, it cannot be that female-led startups oﬀer the same expected payoﬀs with lower
variance, or higher expected payoﬀs with the same variance. If that were the case male investors with solely financial
(mean-variance optimizing) motives would prefer these startups as well.
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fixed, the two groups of investors have similar investment objectives.
In panel B of Table 9, we repeat the analysis, here limiting the sample to include only female-
led startups. The results are similar. Note that these estimates cannot be driven by male and
female investors having opposing payoﬀ distribution targets that are simply dominated by a separate
shared objective to invest in “high quality” startups. Startup quality is embedded in the payoﬀ
distribution. Loosely speaking, for an investor with purely financial motives—as assumed under
the joint hypothesis stated at the beginning of this section—a high quality startup is one with
high expected payoﬀs and low variance. Put diﬀerently, an investor with purely financial motives
should only care about a company’s payoﬀ distribution and should not have a separate, more heavily
weighted, investment criterion.
4.3.4 Diﬀerences in investor motives
Another potential explanation for our results relaxes the assumption that all investors have purely
financial motives. This explanation is encompassed up by the joint hypothesis that (1) male in-
vestors have purely financial motives, while female investors have both financial and non-financial
motives and (2) male investors are reluctant to fund female-led startups because they are worse
investments, while female investors derive utility from funding female-led startups. Note that, un-
like the previous explanations we have explored, this explanation requires that male and female
investors have diﬀerent motives.
Related to the joint hypothesis above, there are in fact a handful of early stage funds that have
an explicit social mission of supporting entrepreneurship by women. It is possible female investors
are predominantly associated with such funds and thus have diﬀerent incentives than their male
counterparts. To investigate this, we manually compiled a list of known female-focused angel and
VC funds.18 We find that only 2% of the female investors in our data are associated with such funds
18These funds are: Valor Ventures, Golden Seeds, Pipeline Angels, Built By Girls Ventures, BELLE Capital USA,
Female Founders Fund, The Womens’ Venture Capital Fund, Forerunner Ventures, 500 Women, Angel Academe,
Phenomenelle Angels Fund, Broadway Angels, Topstone Angels, Plum Alley, The Jump Fund, Astia, Scale, Cross
Culture Ventures, Gotham Gal Ventures, True Wealth Ventures, Halogen Ventures, Sofia Fund, Female Funders,
Women Angels, Women Founders Network, Women Launch and Women Lead Inc.
25
(0.5% of those that made least one introduction request). Appendix Table A6 shows our baseline
results excluding these investors. As can be seen, the results change little. Nonetheless, it may be
the case that female investors not associated with such funds still invest with social objectives in
mind.
To further investigate whether our results are driven by non-financial motives, we examine
startup outcomes. If female investors prefer to invest in female founders due to non-financial motives,
we should expect to see female-female investor-founder pairs underperform female-male pairs ex-
post. Similarly, if male investors prefer to invest in male founders due to financial motives, we should
expect to see male-male investor-founder pairs outperform male-female pairs ex-post. This test is
along the lines of Fisman, Paravisini, and Vig (2017) who examine whether loan oﬃcers in India
show a preference for within-caste lending due to financial or non-financial motives by comparing
the ex-post loan performance of within-caste and across-caste loans.
We face a few challenges in implementing this test. First, as mentioned earlier, investment is a
two-sided decision. Therefore, if one defines realized pairs based on investment, it is unclear whether
performance diﬀerences are driven by the way that investors select entrepreneurs or vice versa. To
get around this issue, we define realized pairs based on investor introduction requests. A second
challenge is that few companies in our sample have had a successful exit at this point in time, likely
due to the recency of the platform. While early successes are relatively uncommon, early failures are
not. Therefore, in addition to success we also look at failure. As described in section 3.2, we define
a startup to have failed if its website was no longer active as of November 2016. All regressions
include year fixed eﬀects based on the year a startup joined AngelList to address the concern that
startups from diﬀerent cohorts will have diﬀerential failure rates as of November 2016 due to age
diﬀerences on that date.
The results are shown in Table 10. Observations are now at the startup-investor pair level and
there is one observation for every realized pair based on introduction requests. The variable of
interest, “Same gender,” is an indicator variable equal to one if the founder and investor are of the
same gender. We include investor fixed eﬀects in the even columns, and therefore compare the
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performance of same gender and cross-gender pairs involving the same investor. The regressions
also include a new investor-founder pair variable “Interest overlap” which is the cosine similarity
between the investor’s stated interests and those of the founder.19 This variable helps address any
matching on sector, skill or location preferences between investor-founder pairs. Each panel of the
table reports a diﬀerent company outcome variable. In Panel A the outcome of interest is startup
failure. Columns 1–2 limit the sample to investor pairs involving female investors. We estimate a
statistically insignificant coeﬃcient on the same gender indicator in this case. Thus, though the
sample is small, there does not appear to be any evidence that female investors have a lower bar
for female-led companies due to non-financial motivations.
Column (3) instead limits the sample to pairs involving male investors. In this case we estimate
a significant positive coeﬃcient on the same gender indicator, meaning that the male-led startups
that male investors reach out to are actually more likely to fail than the female-led startups they
reach out to. Column (4) shows similar results with investor fixed eﬀects. Thus, the evidence is
also inconsistent with the view that male investors have strictly financial motivations for favoring
male founders. Panel B of Table 10 repeats the same analysis using an IPO/Acquisition indicator
variable as a measure of success. We find qualitatively similar results in this case. Male-male pairs
underperform male-female pairs, even within-investor. There is no statistically significant diﬀerence
between female-female pairs and female-male pairs.
These findings more generally reinforce our previous findings that male investors do not appear
to favor male founders due to unobservable startup quality, or within-gender screening/monitoring
advantages stemming from sector expertise. Under either of those hypotheses, male-male pairs
should outperform male-female pairs. The fact that male-female pairs outperform instead would
seem to suggest male investors are reluctant to reach out to startups led by female founders for
taste reasons, and therefore only do so for the most promising companies.
19We thank Shai Bernstein for sharing code to compute this measure.
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4.4 Discussion
In previous section, we have attempted to explore the most likely explanations for our baseline
results that involve male investors having purely financial motives for favoring male-led startups
over observably similar female-led startups. Overall, the evidence does not seem consistent with
these explanations. Rather, the evidence appears more consistent with some form of taste-based
discrimination. We define taste-based discrimination broadly to include outright sexism (explicit or
implicit), as well as more subtle things, such as a desire by male investors to mentor founders who
remind them of themselves. We also want to be careful not to completely rule out the possibility
that female investors prefer to invest in female founders for taste-based reasons as well. That is, it is
possible that male and female investors exhibit symmetric homophilistic preferences with respect to
gender. The findings in the previous section—that female-female pairs do no underperform female-
male pairs—would seem inconsistent with symmetric homophilistic preferences. However, given the
small sample size available to us for that test, we may find no significant performance diﬀerence
only because we lack statistical power in the female investor sample. Yet, even if male and female
investors have symmetric taste-based motivations for preferring to invest within-gender, such taste-
based motivations are of greater concern for female founders, as the bulk of early stage investors
are male. Thus, in either case, one implication of our results would be that more female investors
are likely to be necessary to support the entry of more female entrepreneurs.
Moreover, that same implication would also follow, even if—contrary to our findings in Section
4.3—our baseline results were driven by within-gender screening/monitoring advantages. That is,
even if investors symmetrically prefer to invest within gender do to a screening/monitoring advantage
arising from sector specialization (or any other source), our results would still suggest that more
female investors are likely to be necessary to support the entry of more female entrepreneurs. In that
case, it would be because female investors are better suited to pick the best female-led startups to
invest in, or else are better suited to add value to female-led companies after making an investment.
More generally, while our data allow us to make significant progress toward disentangling var-
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ious forms of taste-based and statistical discrimination, we think that even absent the ability to
disentangle them, this paper makes a significant contribution. Any debate about statistical versus
taste-based discrimination begins from the premise that there is diﬀerential treatment in the first
place. However, up until this point, most evidence of diﬀerential treatment in the entrepreneurship
setting has been indirect at best, due to the fact that most datasets only cover startups that success-
fully raise capital. We find credible evidence, based on a large sample of fundraising startups, that
female-led startups have more diﬃculty garnering interest and raising capital from male investors
compared to observably similar male-led startups.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine whether male investors are biased against female entrepreneurs. To do
so, we use a unique dataset obtained from AngelList, which allows us to observe detailed investor-
founder interactions for a large sample of fundraising startups, some of which succeed in raising
capital and some of which fail. We find that female founders are significantly less successful garnering
interest and raising capital from male investors compared to observably similar male founders. In
contrast, the same female founders are actually more successful than male founders with female
investors. The results do not appear to be driven by diﬀerences across founder gender in startup
quality, sector focus, or risk. They also do not appear to be driven by diﬀerences in the motives
of male and female investors. Overall, our findings are most consistent with either (1) taste-based
discrimination by male investors and no gender discrimination by female-investors or (2) taste-based
discrimination by both male and female investors in favor of their own gender.
In either case, given that the bulk of investors are male, our results suggest that an increase in
female investors is likely necessary to support an increase in female entrepreneurship. The results
nicely complement those of Gompers and Wang (2017a) who find that gender diversity in venture
capital firms has important eﬀects on investment choice and outcomes. However, given that early
stage investors are often drawn from the pool of former entrepreneurs, which at this point is mostly
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male, the above conclusion gives rise to a “chicken and egg” problem. Thus, one implication of
our findings is that policies like the JOBS Act, which promote the democratization of capital by
facilitating various forms of equity crowdfunding, may be key to changing the existing equilibrium.
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Figures and Tables
Table 1: Gender distribution on AngelList, Crunchbase and VentureSource
Notes: The table reports the percent of women in entrepreneurial firm founder positions or as
investors in three databases. The AngelList sample includes the startups and investors active on
the platform starting in late 2009. Startups are those that sought capital publicly on the website.
Crunchbase is a wiki-style website of startups, investors and exits maintained since 2010. Ven-
tureSource is a database of venture capital financings and investors provided by VentureSource.
Gender of both founders and investors was identified using the algorithm and manual assign-
ment detailed in Section 3.3. Crunchbase numbers for founders are for firms founded between
2010 and the present and headquartered in the U.S.. The VentureSource founder statistics are
for firms founded between 2010–2015. The VentureSource investor statistics report the fraction
of board members of firms financed between 2010–present that are women.
AngelList Crunchbase VentureSource
% firms with female CEO/founders 15.8% 13% 11%
% firms with any female founder 20.9% 13.4% 17.3%
% female investors 8% 5% 6.5%
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Table 3: Diﬀerences in female and male investors with at least one introduction
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for male and female investors—who have
made at least one introduction—where we can identify the LinkedIn data. All variables
measured as of June 2017 and defined in Table 2. “Previous founder” is defined only for
individuals that have at least one listed position on their LinkedIn profile.
Male investor Female investors
Obs Mean Median Std dev Obs Mean Median Std dev
Bach. degree 3607 0.95 1.00 0.22 278 0.97 1.00 0.18
MBA 3607 0.24 0.00 0.43 278 0.24 0.00 0.43
PhD/MD/JD 3607 0.08 0.00 0.26 278 0.10 0.00 0.30
Previous founder 3774 0.57 1.00 0.49 298 0.52 1.00 0.50
Number jobs on LinkedIn 3774 4.71 5.00 1.11 298 5.04 5.00 1.99
Age 3123 40.32 39.00 9.71 219 38.21 37.00 9.33
Interest overlap 2697 0.17 0.14 0.14 256 0.16 0.13 0.14
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Table 7: Shares, introductions and funds raised from female and male investors
Note: The table repeats the analysis of Tables 4–6, with outcomes corresponding to female
investors rather than male investors. A unit of observation is a US-based startup on the platform
where we can identify the gender of all the founders and where the capital sought is at least
$5000. Variables are as defined in Table A1. All the “FE” are as defined in Table 4. Robust
standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance: ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
Female investor interest
Received share Received intro. Raised round
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0757⇤⇤⇤ 0.0783⇤⇤⇤ 0.0128⇤⇤⇤ 0.0204⇤⇤⇤ 0.00682⇤⇤⇤ 0.00855⇤⇤⇤
(0.00531) (0.00534) (0.00420) (0.00418) (0.00227) (0.00227)
Previous founder 0.0112⇤⇤⇤ 0.0197⇤⇤⇤ 0.00465⇤
(0.00407) (0.00510) (0.00250)
Bach. degree 0.00730⇤⇤⇤ 0.0123⇤⇤⇤ -0.000207
(0.00252) (0.00308) (0.00145)
PhD/MD/JD 0.00948 0.00128 -0.00454
(0.00854) (0.0105) (0.00430)
MBA -0.00368 -0.00566 -0.00139
(0.00509) (0.00678) (0.00317)
Elite school (any) -0.000387 0.0229⇤⇤⇤ 0.00450
(0.00524) (0.00747) (0.00347)
Log capital sought 0.000500 0.00528⇤⇤⇤ 0.00149⇤⇤⇤
(0.000744) (0.000803) (0.000425)
Constant 0.0685⇤⇤ 0.0567 0.221⇤⇤⇤ 0.155⇤⇤⇤ 0.0242 0.00536
(0.0286) (0.0403) (0.0462) (0.0494) (0.0171) (0.0166)
Observations 17780 17780 17780 17780 17780 17780
R2 0.0531 0.0684 0.0192 0.0710 0.00383 0.0165
Round year FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm join year FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Team size FE? N Y N Y N Y
Sector FE? N Y N Y N Y
Location FE? N Y N Y N Y
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Table 8: Shares, intros and funds raised from female and male investors: Sector diﬀerences and
robustness
Note: The table repeats the estimation from Tables 4–7 for sub-samples of entrepreneurial firms
split by sector classification or alternative fixed eﬀect specifications. Panel A presents the subset
of firms excluding those with tags that are either predominantly women or predominantly men.
Here, predominantly female tags are tags where more than 32% (twice as large as population
percentage) of firms with that tag are female-founded. Predominantly male tags are those with
less than half of the female percentage (8%). Panel B presents the main specification where the
sector fixed eﬀects are replaced by tag combination fixed eﬀects based on the combination of
sector tags listed on a startup’s AngelList profile. Startups can have more than one tag. Panel
C excludes startups where there was consensus in an online survey showing the company’s
description that it was a gender-neutral firm. All regressions include the controls found in Table
7 with the exception of Panel B that replaces sector FE with tag FE. Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. Significance: ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
Panel A: Excluding startups with gender-dominant tags
Received share Received intro. Received capital
Female Male Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0781⇤⇤⇤ -0.0640⇤⇤⇤ 0.0177⇤⇤⇤ -0.0192⇤⇤ 0.00709⇤⇤ -0.0102⇤⇤⇤
(0.00691) (0.00585) (0.00516) (0.00840) (0.00285) (0.00351)
Observations 11175 11175 11175 11175 11175 11175
R2 0.0648 0.167 0.0626 0.152 0.0166 0.0563
Mean dep. var. 0.0222 0.115 0.0336 0.165 0.00770 0.0304
Panel B: Inclusion of sector tags as controls
Received share Received intro. Received capital
Female Male Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0676⇤⇤⇤ -0.0662⇤⇤⇤ 0.0230⇤⇤⇤ -0.0130⇤ 0.00642⇤⇤ -0.0103⇤⇤⇤
(0.00554) (0.00554) (0.00473) (0.00762) (0.00266) (0.00376)
Observations 17063 17063 17063 17063 17063 17063
R2 0.226 0.266 0.210 0.245 0.174 0.184
Founders 16706 16706 16706 16706 16706 16706
Mean dep. var. 0.0253 0.125 0.0394 0.180 0.00873 0.0404
Panel C: Manually categorized gender neutral startups
Received share Received intro. Received capital
Female Male Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0680⇤⇤⇤ -0.0746⇤⇤⇤ 0.0214⇤⇤ -0.0323⇤⇤ 0.00483 -0.0121⇤
(0.0112) (0.0104) (0.00962) (0.0142) (0.00471) (0.00653)
Observations 4330 4330 4330 4330 4330 4330
R2 0.0556 0.184 0.0728 0.166 0.0148 0.0616
Controls? Y Y Y Y Y Y
FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 9: Relationship between male and female investor interest
Notes: This table reports the linear probability estimates of male investor interest for startups
by each founder gender. Panel A considers the set of male founders and Panel B considers the
set of female founders. The variable of interest “Had female inv. interest” is equal to one if the
startup received at least one share, introduction request, or investment round from a female
investor, respectively. A unit of observation is a US-based startup on the platform where we can
identify the gender of all the founders and where the capital sought is at least $5000. Variables
and fixed eﬀects are as defined in Table 4. “FE” include, round year, firm join year, team size,
sector and location fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance:
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
Panel A: Male founders
Received from a male investor:
Share Intro Funding
(1) (2) (3)
Had female inv. interest 0.313⇤⇤⇤ 0.461⇤⇤⇤ 0.151⇤⇤⇤
(0.0184) (0.0170) (0.0161)
Previous founder 0.0260⇤⇤⇤ 0.0303⇤⇤⇤ 0.0127⇤⇤
(0.00818) (0.00919) (0.00524)
Bach. degree 0.0269⇤⇤⇤ 0.0434⇤⇤⇤ 0.0129⇤⇤⇤
(0.00555) (0.00634) (0.00325)
PhD/MD/JD -0.0273⇤ -0.00745 0.00323
(0.0154) (0.0178) (0.0112)
MBA 0.00239 -0.00173 -0.00561
(0.0109) (0.0123) (0.00706)
Elite school (any) 0.0248⇤⇤ 0.0527⇤⇤⇤ 0.0113
(0.0114) (0.0132) (0.00785)
Log capital sought 0.00447⇤⇤⇤ 0.0107⇤⇤⇤ 0.00534⇤⇤⇤
(0.00172) (0.00193) (0.000873)
Observations 14959 14959 14959
R2 0.211 0.212 0.0861
Mean dep. var. 0.138 0.183 0.0363
Panel B: Female founders
Share Intro Funding
Had female inv. interest 0.107⇤⇤⇤ 0.259⇤⇤⇤ 0.0524⇤⇤⇤
(0.0201) (0.0272) (0.0127)
Previous founder 0.00543 0.0247 0.0196⇤
(0.0144) (0.0224) (0.0114)
Bach. degree 0.0186⇤⇤ 0.0391⇤⇤⇤ 0.00587
(0.00754) (0.0128) (0.00498)
PhD/MD/JD -0.0387 -0.0209 -0.0238
(0.0247) (0.0403) (0.0161)
MBA 0.0158 0.0374 -0.00459
(0.0199) (0.0291) (0.0138)
Elite school (any) 0.0391⇤⇤ 0.0661⇤⇤ 0.0320⇤⇤
(0.0185) (0.0275) (0.0147)
Log capital sought 0.00355 0.0204⇤⇤⇤ 0.00365⇤⇤⇤
(0.00217) (0.00364) (0.00128)
Observations 2821 2821 2821
R2 0.130 0.233 0.0710
Mean dep. var. 0.0425 0.138 0.0163
FE? Y Y Y
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Table 10: Diﬀerences in outcomes by investor gender: introductions
Notes: The table reports linear probability model estimates for the dependent variables defined
in Table A1. Here a unit of observation is a pair: investor requesting an introduction and startup
founder. That is, for each observed introduction, the variable “Same gender” is equal to one if the
founder and investor have the same gender. Columns (1) and (2) in each panel considers the set
of female investors, while (3) and (4) show the results for men. Each panel uses the dependent
variables measuring startup success as defined in Table A1. The even columns include investor
fixed eﬀects. Controls (not reported) include fixed eﬀects for year, sector, and team size along
with controls for capital sought, serial founder and the pairwise “interest overlap” defined in
Table A1. Robust standard errors clustered at the investor level are reported in parentheses.
Significance: ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
Panel A: Startup failed
Investor gender
Female Female Male Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Same gender 0.001000 -0.00915 0.0640⇤⇤⇤ 0.0693⇤⇤⇤
(0.0434) (0.0548) (0.0124) (0.0151)
Interest overlap 0.0158 -0.0694 0.0176 0.0159
(0.130) (0.183) (0.0359) (0.0495)
Constant 0.305 0.540 0.254⇤ 0.180
(0.490) (0.516) (0.144) (0.191)
Observations 792 792 10887 10887
R2 0.0541 0.0476 0.0837 0.0799
Panel B: Startup had IPO/Acq.
Female Female Male Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Same gender -0.00668 0.00148 -0.0301⇤⇤⇤ -0.0171⇤
(0.0254) (0.0316) (0.00745) (0.00894)
Interest overlap 0.0193 -0.0981 0.0594⇤⇤⇤ 0.0494⇤
(0.0763) (0.106) (0.0216) (0.0294)
Constant -0.0309 -0.00367 0.0810 0.0952
(0.286) (0.297) (0.0870) (0.114)
Observations 792 792 10887 10887
R2 0.0524 0.0734 0.0572 0.0820
Investor FE? N Y N Y
Year FE ? Y Y Y Y
Sector FE ? Y Y Y Y
Location FE ? Y Y Y Y
Team size FE? Y Y Y Y
Controls? Y Y Y Y
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Appendix
Table A1: Variable definitions
Notes: The table describes the main variables used throughout the analysis.
Variable Definition
Received share An indicator equal to one if the startup received at least
one share from a male (female) investor on the AngelList
platform. A share allows an investor to point to a startup’s
profile or fundraising activity to another user on the plat-
form.
Received introduction An indicator equal to one if the startup received at least
one introduction from a male (female) investor on the An-
gelList platform. An introduction is a one-way inquiry by
investor to startup firm when the firm has an fundraising
event listed on their profile. Direct communication between
investor and startup is not possible on the platform without
reciprocal action by the startup firm.
Funded An indicator equal to one if the startup was observed as
raising capital after their fundraising round on AngelList,
Crunchbase, SEC filings or VentureSource.
Startup failed An indicator equal to one if the startup did not have any
online activity as of November 2016 that indicated the firm
was still active. A firm is active if their website does not
return and error and the returned page has some mention
of the startup’s name.
Had IPO or Acquisition An indicator equal to one if the startup firm had an initial
public oﬀering or was acquired by November 2016. Such
exits are observed in either Crunchbase or VentureSource.
Team size The number of founders of the startup as listed in the
startup’s AngelList profile.
Year fundraised The year the startup’s fundraising first began on AngelList.
Capital sought The original capital amount sought in the startup’s first
fundraising campaign on AngelList.
Serial founder An indicator equal to one if the startup founder’s LinkedIn
profile indicated a past title as “founder” or “co-founder” at
a another firm prior to the founding of the current startup.
Bachelors degree An indicator equal to one if the startup founder’s LinkedIn
profile indicated that they received a bachelor’s degree or
equivalent. Such information is also found in the short
founder biography on their AngelList profile and/or their
Crunchbase profile if available.
MD / PhD / JD and MBA An indicator equal to one if the founder had a PhD, MD or
JD (MBA) in their AngelList or LinkedIn profile.
Elite school (any) An indicator equal to one if any of the founder’s pre-startup
degrees were from any of the following universities: MIT,
Princeton, UPenn, U. Chicago, Harvard, Yale, Caltech,
John Hopkins, Duke, Stanford, Yale, Columbia or North-
western.
Years experience pre-startup A count of the number of years from the first observed
job date to the founding of the startup as available on the
founder’s LinkedIn profile.
Age The age in years of a startup founder as defined by the year
of their college graduation (minus 21) observed on their
LinkedIn profile or as reported directly on Crunchbase.
Interest overlap The cosine similarity between the self-assigned tags of each
pair of investor and founder.
1
Table A2: Funding success and gender of founder: AngelList data only
Note: The table reports the linear probability model where the dependent variable is one if the
founder was observed successfully raising their first observed round of financing on AngelList or
VentureSource from a male investor by the end of the sample (11/2015). A unit of observation
is a US-based startup on the platform where we can identify the gender of all the founders
and where the capital sought is at least $5000. The funding dependent variable is one if the
startup raised capital from an investor that is also an active AngelList user. Variables are as
defined in Table A1. All the “FE” are as defined in Table 4. Robust standard errors reported
in parentheses. Significance: ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
Startup raised capital from male investor?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Solo
Female -0.0128⇤⇤⇤ -0.00827⇤⇤⇤ -0.00823⇤⇤⇤ -0.00585⇤⇤⇤ -0.00877⇤⇤
(0.00230) (0.00232) (0.00231) (0.00178) (0.00437)
Female X Previous founder -0.0000402
(0.0000468)
Female X Bachelors -0.00385
(0.00467)
Female X Phd/MD/JD -0.0259⇤
(0.0150)
Female X MBA -0.00259
(0.0128)
Female X Elite school 0.0174
(0.0146)
Previous founder 0.00895⇤⇤ 0.00405 0.00880⇤⇤
(0.00406) (0.00359) (0.00406)
Bach. degree 0.00746⇤⇤⇤ 0.00318 0.00811⇤⇤⇤
(0.00249) (0.00202) (0.00284)
PhD/MD/JD -0.00173 0.0115 0.00221
(0.00812) (0.00882) (0.00925)
MBA -0.00404 0.00527 -0.00410
(0.00536) (0.00521) (0.00595)
Elite school (any) 0.00700 0.00955⇤ 0.00410
(0.00573) (0.00553) (0.00634)
Log capital sought 0.00310⇤⇤⇤ 0.00264⇤⇤⇤ 0.00227⇤⇤⇤ 0.00268⇤⇤⇤
(0.000614) (0.000649) (0.000520) (0.000648)
Constant 0.0874⇤⇤⇤ 0.0460 0.0402 0.0189 0.0398
(0.0313) (0.0307) (0.0306) (0.0249) (0.0306)
Observations 17780 17780 17780 14211 17780
R2 0.00955 0.0343 0.0354 0.00936 0.0354
Round year FE? Y Y Y Y Y
Firm join year FE? Y Y Y Y Y
Team size FE? N Y Y Y Y
Sector FE? N Y Y Y Y
Location FE? N Y Y Y Y
2
Table A3: Additional controls
Notes: The table repeats the analysis found in Tables 4-6 with additional controls. The variable
Total pre-startup jobs represents the total number of jobs the focal founder reported on LinkedIn
prior to founding the startup, Years emp. experience represents the total number of years
between the start year of the founder’s first reported job on LinkedIn and the year of the
AngelList fundraising campaign, Age represents the founder’s imputed age (year of fundraising
campaign - year of college graduation + 22), Length of description represents the number of
characters in the product description. Missing values of all variables are dummied out. A unit
of observation is a US-based startup on the platform where we can identify the gender of all
the founders and where the capital sought is at least $5000. Variables are as defined in Table
A1. All the “FE” are as defined in Table 4. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Significance: ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
Share Intro. Funded
(1) (2) (3)
Female -0.0713⇤⇤⇤ -0.0154⇤⇤ -0.00979⇤⇤⇤
(0.00469) (0.00670) (0.00280)
Log total pre-startup jobs 0.00821 0.0319⇤⇤⇤ 0.00784
(0.00731) (0.00882) (0.00484)
Log years emp. experience -0.00789 -0.0190⇤⇤⇤ -0.00444
(0.00556) (0.00684) (0.00330)
Age (yrs) -0.000625 -0.00112⇤ -0.000128
(0.000588) (0.000668) (0.000352)
Log length of description 0.0124⇤⇤⇤ 0.00421⇤⇤ 0.00414⇤⇤⇤
(0.00154) (0.00207) (0.000787)
Constant 0.420⇤⇤⇤ 0.390⇤⇤⇤ 0.0157
(0.0761) (0.0776) (0.0357)
Baseline Controls? Y Y Y
Baseline FEs? Y Y Y
Observations 17780 17780 17780
R2 0.179 0.164 0.0617
3
Table A4: Baseline results excluding consumer sectors
Notes: The table reports the regressions found in Table 7 after excluding startups in the con-
sumer services and consumer products sectors. A unit of observation is a US-based startup on
the platform where we can identify the gender of all the founders and where the capital sought
is at least $5000. Variables are as defined in Table A1. All the “FE” and “Controls” are as
defined in Table 4. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance: ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤
p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
Received share Received intro. Received capital
Female Male Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0893⇤⇤⇤ -0.0854⇤⇤⇤ 0.0182⇤⇤ -0.0244⇤⇤ 0.00545 -0.0181⇤⇤⇤
(0.00936) (0.00751) (0.00732) (0.0115) (0.00379) (0.00497)
Observations 8618 8618 8618 8618 8618 8618
R2 0.0750 0.190 0.0791 0.167 0.0150 0.0659
Controls? Y Y Y Y Y Y
FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table A5: Gender neutral startups based on mean response
Notes: The table reports the regressions found in Table 7 after excluding startups where
the average survey respondent labeled the firm as gender-neutral. A unit of observation
is a US-based startup on the platform where we can identify the gender of all the founders
and where the capital sought is at least $5000. Variables are as defined in Table A1. All the
“FE” and “Controls” are as defined in Table 4. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Significance: ⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
Received share Received intro. Received capital
Female Male Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0789⇤⇤⇤ -0.0686⇤⇤⇤ 0.0216⇤⇤⇤ -0.0133⇤ 0.00987⇤⇤⇤ -0.00856⇤⇤
(0.00621) (0.00550) (0.00493) (0.00770) (0.00280) (0.00343)
Observations 14692 14692 14692 14692 14692 14692
R2 0.0663 0.185 0.0717 0.163 0.0160 0.0625
Controls? Y Y Y Y Y Y
FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
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Table A6: Excluding social mission investors
Notes: The table repeats the analysis found in Tables 4-6. The sample here excludes all
outcomes – shares, introductions or funding – made by investors on the AngelList plat-
form identified as “social investors.” These investors are Valor Ventures, Golden Seeds,
Pipeline Angels, Built By Girls Ventures, BELLE Capital USA, Female Founders Fund,
The Womens’ Venture Capital Fund, Forerunner Ventures, 500 Women, Angel Academe,
Phenomenelle Angels Fund, Broadway Angels, Topstone Angels, Plum Alley, The Jump
Fund, Astia, Scale, Cross Culture Ventures, Gotham Gal Ventures, True Wealth Ven-
tures, Halogen Ventures, Sofia Fund, Female Funders, Women Angels, Women Founders
Network, Women Launch and Women Lead Inc. A unit of observation is a US-based
startup on the platform where we can identify the gender of all the founders and where
the capital sought is at least $5000. Variables are as defined in Table A1. All the “FE”
are as defined in Table 4. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance:⇤
p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
Female investor interest, no social investors
Received share Received intro. Raised round
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0757⇤⇤⇤ 0.0783⇤⇤⇤ 0.0129⇤⇤⇤ 0.0204⇤⇤⇤ 0.00262 0.00378⇤⇤
(0.00531) (0.00534) (0.00420) (0.00418) (0.00168) (0.00170)
Previous founder 0.0112⇤⇤⇤ 0.0191⇤⇤⇤ 0.00359⇤
(0.00407) (0.00509) (0.00208)
Bach. degree 0.00730⇤⇤⇤ 0.0121⇤⇤⇤ -0.000313
(0.00252) (0.00308) (0.00120)
PhD/MD/JD 0.00948 0.00166 -0.00204
(0.00854) (0.0105) (0.00354)
MBA -0.00368 -0.00520 -0.000836
(0.00509) (0.00677) (0.00256)
Elite school (any) -0.000387 0.0221⇤⇤⇤ 0.000276
(0.00524) (0.00744) (0.00257)
Log capital sought 0.000500 0.00523⇤⇤⇤ 0.000563
(0.000744) (0.000802) (0.000352)
Constant 0.0685⇤⇤ 0.0567 0.221⇤⇤⇤ 0.156⇤⇤⇤ -0.000194 -0.0122⇤⇤⇤
(0.0286) (0.0403) (0.0462) (0.0494) (0.000146) (0.00238)
Observations 17780 17780 17780 17780 17780 17780
R2 0.0531 0.0684 0.0192 0.0707 0.00163 0.00895
Round year FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm join year FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Team size FE? N Y N Y N Y
Sector FE? N Y N Y N Y
Location FE? N Y N Y N Y
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